Towards an Interactive Acculturation Model: A Social Psychological Approach

Richard Y. Bourhis, Léna Céline Moïse, Stéphane Perreault, and Sacha Senécal

Université du Québec à Montréal, Québec, Canada

The first part of this paper proposes a continuum of ideological premises that seeks to account for the broad range of immigrant integration policies adopted by Western democratic states. In the second part, a review of Social Psychological models of immigrant acculturation strategies demonstrates the need to explain more clearly the interactive nature of immigrant and host community relations. The Interactive Acculturation Model (IAM) presented next proposes that relational outcomes are the product of the acculturation orientations of both the host majority and immigrant groups as influenced by state integration policies. The model makes predictions regarding the acculturation combinations most likely to produce consensual, problematic, and conflictual relational outcomes between immigrants and members of the host community. Social psychological research is needed to test the validity of the IAM model empirically.

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this article is to present an overview of public policy and social psychological issues related to immigrant and host community relations in multicultural societies. The first part of the article proposes a typology of the different types of ideologies that underly the policies adopted by the state to deal with immigration and integration issues in democracies of the Western world. It is proposed that state integration policies can have a decisive impact on the acculturation orientation of both immigrants and members of the host society.

Immigration normally implies an adaptation process on the part of the migrating group as well as on the part of the host society. Anthropologists coined the term acculturation to describe...
the process of bidirectional change that takes place when two ethnocultural groups come into contact with one another. Graves (1967) proposed the term psychological acculturation to account for changes experienced by an individual whose cultural group is collectively experiencing acculturation. For Berry (1990a, p. 235), this psychological acculturation represents more accurately what immigrants experience: "the process by which individuals change, both by being influenced by contact with another culture and by being participants in the general acculturative changes under way in their own culture." The second part of this paper provides a Social Psychological analysis of the models proposed to account for the acculturation orientations of immigrants within their country of adoption.

The third part of the article proposes a social psychological framework known as the Interactive Acculturation Model (IAM), which takes account of the dynamic interplay of host community and immigrant acculturation orientations. The model proposes combinations of host community and immigrant group acculturation orientations that are most likely to produce consensual, problematic, or conflicting relational outcomes between immigrant and host community members.

IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION POLICIES

As can be seen in Fig. 1, "government decision makers" made up of elected representatives and appointed administrators are those usually involved in formulating public policies concerning immigrants issues (Helly, 1992). As seen in our framework, both the dominant host majority and immigrant communities can have some impact on immigrant policies adopted by government decision makers. Such public policies can be grouped in the following two categories: (1) state immigration policies deal with decisions about the number, type, and national origin of immigrants who are accepted in the country, and (2) state integration policies consist of approaches and measures adopted by state agencies to help immigrants integrate within the host society. Integration policies can also include measures to foster host community acceptance of immigrants.

Adaptation problems experienced by immigrants and rising tensions between host community members and immigrant groups are factors that stimulate governments to formulate integration policies designed to facilitate the integration of immigrants within the host society. In some cases immigration and integration policies are quite concordant with each other whereas in other situations these policies are only vaguely related or even contradictory. Integration policies designed to complement specific immigration policies would seem optimal in facilitating immigrant and host community adaptation in multicultural settings.

Given the complexity of designing and coordinating public policies dealing with immigration and integration issues, government decision makers are likely to create state agencies whose purpose is to conduct the research necessary to plan and formulate public policies regarding immigration and integration issues. As seen in Fig. 1, such state agencies may also be given the responsibility of implementing the immigration and integration policies adopted by ruling political parties constituting the elected government of the day. As in the case of language planning (Bourhis, 1984), such state agencies can also be given the task of conducting the research necessary to evaluate periodically the effectiveness of implementation procedures with the view of improving existing programmes or proposing new policies better suited to changing political, economic, and demographic circumstances. Thus, state agencies in consultation with specialists from universities and research institutes can play a role in formulating and implementing the immigration and integration policies of a given state.

State Immigration Policies

Usually, modern states articulate their immigration policies based on two basic parameters: the external boundaries of the state and internal boundaries that delineate who can be and who should be accepted as a rightful and authentic citizens of the state (Helly, 1993). The external boundaries of the state are determined by its international frontiers, which in turn define who is categorized as a "fellow national" and who is labelled a "foreigner." According to Article 1 of the Hague Convention of 1930: "It is for each state to determine under its own law who are its nationals." Kaplan (1993) notes that "it is generally accepted that the power to confer citizenship, and to admit and exclude aliens, is inherent in sovereignty and is essential for any political community." Usually, sovereign states have the prerogative to: determine whether to open or close
their frontiers to immigrants; decide on the number and type of immigrants to be accepted within the state; and change its immigration policy depending on circumstances (Hammar, 1985). The state can accept immigration for different reasons, such as: promoting its own economic or social self-interests; for humanitarian considerations; historical relations with the countries of emigration; or because the state has difficulty controlling its own frontiers.

**Internal boundaries** relate to the question of who is, and who should be the immigrant relative to native members of the host society (Breeton, 1988). Legally, socially, and economically, are immigrants equal to members of the host majority or are they temporary, marginal, or even undesirable elements within the host society? Thus, immigrants who by definition are individuals who in their lifetime have settled in a country of adoption are not necessarily recognized as full citizens by the host country (Kaplan, 1993). State policies may define the "social psychological reality" of being an immigrant by creating categories of immigrants such as: guest worker, temporary resident, foreigner, landed immigrant, etc. (Hammar, 1985). Such categories may be extended to the children of immigrants born in the host country, thus defining them as second-generation immigrants until such time as they may be granted full citizenship by the state. The legal status ascribed to first- and second-generation immigrants can have a strong impact on the acculturation orientations of immigrants within the host society. Castles
BOURHIS ET AL. (1984, p. 161) aptly summarized these consequences as follows:

People who lack security of residence, civil and political rights are prevented from participating fully in society. They do not have the opportunity of deciding to what extent they want to interact with the rest of the population, and to what extent they want to preserve their own culture and norms. The choice is pre-empted by legal disabilities, which lead to isolation, separatism and alienation. The option of becoming a citizen may not lead to equality and full participation, but it is a pre-condition for it.

Immigrants settling in a country of adoption may be faced with one or more host communities. In the simplest case, the host society is made up a single dominant majority sharing a common ancestral language and culture. In other cases the host society is made up not only of a dominant majority but also includes indigenous ethnocultural minorities who were incorporated within the state at some point in history (e.g. Basques, Bretons, Corsicans in France; American Indians and Inuits in the USA and Canada). In other cases the host society is also comprised of second- and third-generation immigrant groups who have been more or less integrated legally and socially within the dominant host society (e.g. Mexican Americans in the USA; North Africans in France; Turks in Germany). Thus immigrants may not only need to define themselves vis-à-vis the dominant host majority but may also need to consider their relationship with indigenous host minorities as well as with previously established immigrant communities (including their own) who have retained aspects of their ethnocultural distinctiveness within the host country. Given the conceptual goals of this article, we will limit our discussion to cases involving immigrant adaptation to a single host community that often constitutes the dominant majority of the host society. However, for a study of immigrant adaptation to two rival host communities, see a recent analysis of the Québec case (Bourhis, 1994).

Immigrants, by their very presence as newcomers, may trigger a redefinition of the collective identity of the dominant host society. In some cases, the arrival of substantial numbers of immigrants may challenge the founding myths of the nation, based, for example, on the ethnocultural homogeneity of the host majority. For instance, in today’s reunified Germany, the possible granting of full citizenship to the five million “foreigners” recorded by the Ministry of Labour in 1991 (Turks, Yugoslavians) would challenge the “blood citizenship” foundation of German national identity (Peralva, 1994). Such a challenge may also trigger questions about the role of the state in promoting the collective identity of the dominant host community. As noted by Kymlicka (1995), should the resources of the state be used to promote only the culture of majority members of the host society or should state funds also be used to maintain the language and culture of immigrant minorities who are also taxpayers in their country of adoption? Thus, by their very presence, immigrants can compel a reassessment of the role of the state in defining and promoting the collective identity of the dominant host society.

State Integration Policies

Given that a sizeable proportion of world migrations flow from less-developed countries to post-industrial states, the analyses presented in this article have been developed to apply mainly to modern democratic states of the Western world. When integration policies are adopted in such countries, they are usually planned to foster the necessary conditions for what is considered the “successful” integration of immigrants within the host majority. Such policies often reflect the ideological orientation of the economically, demographically, and politically dominant group of the host society in question. Consequently such policies are often formulated as though only immigrants had to shoulder the burden of adaptation to the host society (Kymlicka, 1995).

As a possible heuristic, we propose four clusters of state ideologies that can shape integration policies towards immigrants (cf. Breton, 1988; Driegeger, 1989; Helly, 1994). As seen in Fig. 1, these four clusters can be situated in a continuum that ranges from the “pluralism ideology” at one pole to the “ethnict ideology” at the opposite pole. Each of the four ideological clusters on this continuum are likely to produce specific public policies concerning the integration of immigrant groups. It must be noted that these clusters are not mutually exclusive and that modern states may be situated anywhere along the ideological continuum depending on the specific configuration of their policies towards immigrants in different domains including legal, economic, linguistic, cultural, and political integration. Furthermore, it is clear that public policies con-
cerning the integration of immigrants can be seen as "normative discourse" issued by the state, which may coincide more or less with the actual application of such policies at the community, regional, or national level (Lapeyrone, 1991). There is a growing body of evidence showing that the actual integration practices observed in the field in domains such as schooling, employment, and social services and within public institutions may differ from "officially declared" integration policies adopted by the state (Breton & Reitz, 1994; McAndrew, 1996). However, given the immediate goals of the present article it will be sufficient to situate particular countries along the proposed ideological continuum while keeping in mind that discrepancies between official and actual integration practices produce a more complex picture than that portrayed in Fig. 1.

Our ideological continuum of state integration policies is proposed as the public policy backdrop needed to contextualize the individually based acculturation orientations discussed in the other parts of the article. As proposed in Fig. 1, the implementation of these integration policies can have a decisive impact on the acculturation orientation of both immigrants and members of the host community. Thus, the acculturation orientations of individuals proposed later do not emerge in a social or political vacuum but rather are influenced by the integration policies adopted by the state, which in turn may also reflect the acculturation orientations of the dominant group within the host society.

**Pluralism Ideology.** The pluralism ideology shares a fundamental premise with all the other integration ideologies in the continuum. This is that the modern state expects that immigrants will adopt the public values of the host country, which include: commitment to democratic ideals, adherence to the Civil and Criminal code as well as adherence to values expressed in Human Rights Charters and/or Constitution of the state. However, this ideology also upholds that the state has no mandate in defining or regulating the private values of its citizens, whose individual liberties in personal domains must be respected. By private values one refers to freedom from state control in personal activities related to domestic, interpersonal, and associative relations. Private values include community involvement related to linguistic and cultural activities, religious expression, and freedom of association in the political, economic, and leisure spheres. All such private activities are declared free from state control as long as they are conducted within the boundaries of "acceptable conduct" as defined by the criminal and civil laws of the host country.

What distinguishes the pluralism ideology from the other approaches is that the state is willing, upon the request of interested parties, to support financially and socially the private activities of its indigenous minority groups as well as those of first- and second-generation immigrant communities. One premise of this approach is that it is considered of value to the host community that immigrants maintain key features of their cultural and linguistic distinctiveness while adopting the public values of the host majority. Another premise is that, given that both the host majority and immigrant groups pay taxes, it is equitable that state funds be distributed to support both majority and immigrant group ethnocultural activities (Kymlicka, 1995). Though this approach recognizes the value of ethnocultural diversity for the state, its opponents claim that it has the potential of undermining the maintenance of a core majority language and culture needed to justify the continued existence of the nation as a unified country (Bibby, 1990). An example of an integration policy inspired by the pluralism ideology is Canada's Multiculturalism Act adopted in 1988 (Bourhuis et al., 1996; Drieger, 1996; Fleras & Elliot, 1992).

**Civic Ideology.** The civic ideology shares two important features of the pluralism ideology: (1) the expectation that immigrants adopt the public values of the host country and (2) that the state has no right to interfere with the private values of its individual citizens. Unlike the multiculturalism ideology, the civic ideology enshrines as a principle that no state fund or endorsement can be granted for the maintenance or promotion of the private values of particular groups of individuals. Thus the civic ideology is characterized by an official state policy of nonintervention in the private values of specific groups of individuals including those of immigrant and ethnocultural minorities. However, this ideology does respect the right of individuals to organize collectively in order to maintain or promote their respective group distinctiveness based on cultural, linguistic, ethnic, or religious affiliation.

The civic ideology is most readily legitimized in ethnically and culturally homogeneous states. However, many states are ethnoculturally hetero-
geneous and in such settings the civic ideology amounts to state funding of the cultural interest of the dominant majority group while little financial support or official recognition is given to the culture of immigrant and ethnocultural minorities. To the extent that it practises a noninterventionist integration policy, Great Britain can be seen as an example of a country espousing a civic ideology (Schnapper, 1992). In this case, state intervention focuses on promoting a better integration of immigrants through the adoption of anti-discrimination laws, while little funding or official recognition is granted to immigrants as distinctive ethnocultural groups.

Assimilation Ideology. As with the pluralism and civic ideologies, the assimilation ideology also includes the expectation that immigrants adopt the public values of the host country. Although the assimilation ideology upholds the general principle that the state has no right to interfere with the private values of its individual citizens, there are some domains of private values where the state is expected to intervene. The assimilation ideology expects immigrants to abandon their own cultural and linguistic distinctiveness for the sake of adopting the culture and values of the dominant group constituting the core of the nation state. Although some countries expect this linguistic and cultural assimilation to occur voluntarily and gradually across the generations, other states impose assimilation through specific laws and regulations that limit manifestations of immigrant linguistic, cultural, or religious distinctiveness in public domains. The assimilation ideology is more likely to emerge in settings where the state apparatus has long been mobilized to serve the interest of a particular class or ethnocultural group. Usually, it is the economically and politically dominant group that is most successful in imposing its own private values and culture as the core of the founding myths of the nation-state. The assimilation ideology was the most prominent orientation at the height of the rise of the nation-state during the 19th and early 20th century.

Up until the middle of this century, the USA was an example of the assimilation ideology in an immigration country of the “New World.” The assimilationist ideology prevailed as subsequent waves of immigrants were expected to lose their respective ethnocultural distinctiveness for the sake of adopting the mainstream values of the “American way of life” (e.g., rugged individualism, capitalistic entrepreneurship). However, as it became evident that the more recent immigrants of the latter half of this century would not readily relinquish their cultural heritage (Glazer & Moynihan, 1970), American integration policy began shifting away from the assimilation position (Drieger, 1989). Without going as far as favouring a multiculturalism policy, current American policy has essentially moved from an assimilation to a civic ideology (Breton & Reitz, 1994; Noblet, 1993).

A variant of the assimilation ideology is the Republican ideology, developed by the bourgeoisie during the French Revolution (1789–1790). Still in force within contemporary France, the republican ideology invokes the notion of the equality of “universal man” as a legitimizing tool for the suppression of ethnocultural differences deemed to be backward or divisive for the unity of the state (Citron, 1991). Immigrant and minority group ethnolinguistic differences must be “levelled out” as a pre-condition for the equal treatment of individuals as citizens of the state (Sabatier & Berry, 1994). In France the dominant republican mainstream centred in the Paris region has systematically repressed the linguistic and cultural distinctiveness of its immigrant and indigenous minorities (Bourhis, 1982; Lodge, 1993). Intergroup tensions resulting from the application of such policies have forced a number of scholars to appraise the merits of the republican ideology more critically (Wieviorka, 1996).

Ethnist Ideology. This ideology shares the first two features of the assimilation ideology, namely that: (1) immigrants must adopt the public values of the host nation, and (2) the state has a right to limit the expression of certain aspects of private values, especially those of immigrant minorities. In some cases the ethnist ideology expects immigrants to reject their own ethnocultural identity for the sake of adopting the private values and culture of the dominant host society. In other cases the ethnist ideology does not expect immigrants to assimilate culturally because the host majority has no intention of ever accepting immigrants as rightful members of the host society. Unlike the other ideologies discussed so far, the ethnist ideology usually defines who can be and who should be citizens of the state in ethnically or religiously exclusive terms (e.g., Germany, Israel, Japan). In some countries the ethnist ideology is enshrined in the notion of blood citizenship (jus sanguinis), whereby only members of selected “racial” groups can gain full legal status.
as citizens of the state (Kaplan, 1993). In such states the nation is defined as being composed of a kernel ancestral ethnic group as determined by birth and kinship. Thus immigrants who do not share this common kinship may never be accepted as legitimate citizens of the state, legally or socially.

Important features of current German immigration policies illustrate the ethnist ideology. German citizenship laws reflect a founding myth based on common blood ties (volkisch, völkschen kern) binding all Germans by virtue of their kinship (Peralva, 1994). For instance “German returning immigrants” from Eastern Europe (Volksdeutsche) are granted full citizenship within months of entry in the country by virtue of “blood ties,” which in some cases are determined by personal or kinship membership in the Nazi party (Wilpert, 1993). In contrast, non-German blood immigrants recruited as “guest workers” (gastarbeiter), such as Turks and their descendants, have tenuous claim to full citizenship and are denied the right to vote in regional and national elections (Esser & Korte, 1985). However as a result of growing criticism, aspects of German citizenship law are becoming less restrictive of late (Hoerder, 1996).

Depending on economic, political, demographic, and military events occurring at the national and international level, state integration policies can shift from one ideological orientation to the other within the continuum depicted in Fig. 1. Thus government integration ideology can shift from the ethnist position to an endorsement of the civic ideology or conversely move from the pluralist position to the assimilationist ideology. Furthermore, state integration policies may be more progressive or less progressive than the orientations held by the majority of the host population. Usually, through its influence on the educational system, public administration, and the mass media, the state can influence public attitudes concerning the legitimacy of the ideological position it has adopted concerning immigration and integration issues.

The premise of the framework presented in Fig. 1 is that state integration policies can have a substantial impact on the acculturation orientations of both immigrant communities and members of the host majority. In democracies, integration policies can also be influenced by the acculturation orientation found to be most prevalent amongst members of the host society. Thus, in a given state the majority of the host population may endorse the assimilation ideology, whereas the civic ideology receives only moderate support and the ethnist and pluralist ideology is endorsed by only minority subgroups of the population. Political tensions may emerge between factions of the host population holding rival ideological views on integration issues. The polarization of ideological positions regarding such issues may lead to the formation of political parties whose main platform is to change state policies on immigration and integration issues. Such is the case in France, where in the 1995 Presidential election the racist “Front National” party obtained 4.5 million votes (15% of the total) with a platform advocating the expulsion of 3 million non-European immigrants (North Africans) as a way of eliminating unemployment and making France ethnically “more French.”

Of interest at this point is how immigrant and host community members as individuals perceive and construct their own orientations towards immigration and integration issues. The framework presented in Fig. 1 proposes that, through intercultural contact, dominant host majority members do influence the acculturation strategies of immigrant group members, who in turn may also affect the orientations of the host majority. Consequently, the remainder of this article is devoted to a Social Psychological analysis of the type of acculturation orientations held by individuals and how such views can affect relational outcomes in encounters between immigrant and host community members.

**IMMIGRANT ACCULTURATION: UNIDIMENSIONAL OR BIDIMENSIONAL PROCESS?**

Gordon (1964) proposed a unidimensional assimilation model to describe the cultural changes undergone by immigrants. Across the life-span, immigrants are portrayed moving along a continuum, with at one pole maintenance of the immigrant culture and at the other adoption of the host culture, usually at the cost of losing the heritage culture. The midpoint on this continuum is biculturalism, in which immigrants retain some features of their heritage culture while adopting key elements of the host culture. Biculturalism is a transitory phase, as the model assumes that successful assimilation inevitably involves a shift from maintenance of the immigrant culture to full adoption of the host culture (Goldlust &
Richmond, 1974; LaFromboise, Coleman, & Ger
ton, 1993).

In this literature, the term assimilation is used to
describe the changes that immigrants make to
adapt to the dominant host culture in order to
become a “rightful member” of the majority, to
fit into the existing social structure of the host
society (Woldemikael, 1987). Through this prism,
problems of adaptation experienced by immi-
grants are attributed to the immigrants themselves,
who are held responsible for their failure or suc-
cess in assimilating to the host society (Glazer &
Moynihan, 1970). This model implies a one-way
change process in which the immigrants assimilate
and are “absorbed” into the host society.

A premise of the assimilation model is that
relations between the host majority and immigrant
groups usually favour the dominant host commu-
nity. Implicitly, the assimilation model does situ-
ate immigrant groups within the lower echelons
of the social hierarchy found in most stratified socie-
ties. Furthermore, as a numerical minority, immi-
grants are seen as having less status and institu-
tional control than the dominant host major-
ity in domains such as education, mass media,
business, and government institutions. Thus a pre-
valent view has been to expect immigrants to be
more likely to assimilate to the dominant host
society than to expect the host majority to assim-
ilate to the cultures of its immigrant minorities.
However, colonial history does provide cases in
which technologically and militarily advanced
European immigrants eventually supplanted the
host society; culturally, economically, politically
demographically.

Though the unidimensional model has been the
dominant framework used to account for immi-
grant adaptation for many decades, the model
fails to account for the fact that the host majority
is also changed by the presence of culturally dis-
tinctive immigrants (Taft, 1953). As pointed out
by Sayegh and Lasry (1993, p. 99) it is difficult
“to imagine a host society which would not be
transformed after immigrants have been accepted
as full participants into the social and institutional
networks of that society” (italics added).

Bidimensional Models of
Acculturation

Criticism of the unidimensional assimilation
model lead to the development of bidimensional
models of acculturation in which the degree of
immigrant identification to aspects of both their
own heritage culture and that of the host society
were assessed separately. Berry (1974, 1980) was
the first to propose that immigrant and host cultural
identity could be portrayed as independent dimen-
sions rather than as extreme points of a single
bipolar continuum. At the core of this approach is
the assumption that, rather than being in opposition
with each other along a single dimension, the immi-
grant and host community identities are shaped as
distinct processes that develop separately along
orthogonal dimensions. Various bidimensional fra-
ameworks were used to develop different models of
immigrant acculturation, each using orthogonal
dimensions including biculturalism and intensity
of cultural involvement (LaFromboise et al.,
1993; Szapocznik, Kurtines, & Fernandez,
1980), degree of ingroup and outgroup ethnocul-
tural identification (Hutnik, 1986; Oetting & Beau-
vais, 1991; Sayegh & Lasry, 1993; Zak; 1973),
assimilation vs. retention of heritage culture, and
adoption of normative vs. non-normative activities
(Moghaddam, 1988, 1992).

From a Social Psychological perspective the
most useful bidimensional model of immigrant
acculturation remains the one proposed by Berry
(1974, 1980). According to Berry’s psychologi-
cal acculturation model, immigrants settled in
the host society must confront two basic issues.
The first is about deciding whether or not the
immigrant culture is of value and should be
retained; the second has to do with the desirabil-
ity of intergroup contact, deciding whether rela-
tions with the host society should be sought or
avoided. As can be seen in Fig. 2a, Berry’s
(1980, 1984) immigrant acculturation model in-
volves the following two dimensions: (1) “Is
it considered to be of value to maintain cultural
identity and characteristics?”; and (2) “Is it
considered to be of value to maintain relations-
ships with other groups?” Using the Berry immi-
grant acculturation scale (IAS; Berry, Kim,
Power, Young, & Bujaki, 1989), questionnaire
items tapping these two dimensions are addres-
sed in the context of important immigrant
life domains such as cultural maintenance, endog-
amy-exogamy, education, employment, and
community involvement. The questionnaire
items constituting the immigrant acculturation
scale (IAS) are scored using a seven-point Likert
scale. As can be seen in Fig. 2a, combinations of
questionnaire responses to these two dimensions
yield the following four acculturation strategies:
integration, assimilation, separation, and
marginalization (Berry, 1984). The integration
strategy reflects a desire to maintain key features of the immigrant cultural identity while adopting aspects of the host majority culture. Immigrants who adopt the assimilation strategy essentially relinquish their own cultural identity for the sake of adopting the cultural identity of the host majority. The separation strategy is characterized by the desire to maintain all features of the immigrant cultural identity while rejecting relationships with members of the majority host culture. Finally, marginalization characterizes individuals who reject both their own and the host community culture, thereby losing contact with both their heritage culture and that of the host majority.
These four acculturation orientations can be adopted by individual immigrants or by groups of immigrants from the same cultural or national origin. Responses on the Berry (1984) immigrant acculturation scale (IAS) could show that a majority of individuals from an immigrant group endorse an integration orientation whereas the assimilation and separation orientation is preferred by only a few individual immigrants. Furthermore, immigrants from a particular ethnic origin may overwhelmingly adopt the assimilation strategy whereas the majority of immigrants from another country of origin may prefer the separation strategy.

Berry and his associates conducted numerous empirical studies to assess the acculturation strategies of various immigrant groups in North America (Berry, 1980; Berry et al. 1989). The IAS was completed by the following first-generation immigrant groups: Portuguese, Hungarians, and Koreans in Canada (Berry et al., 1989); Lebanese in Canada (Sayegh & Lasry, 1993), and Indian immigrants in the USA (Berry & Krishnan, 1992). Results obtained with each of these immigrant groups showed that integration was the preferred mode of acculturation, followed either by assimilation or separation, while marginalisation was the least preferred mode of acculturation. Furthermore, Berry, Kim, Minde, and Mok (1987) found that immigrants in Canada who adopted the integration strategy were minimally affected by acculturative stress whereas those who felt marginalized tended to be highly stressed, closely followed by those adopting the separation strategy. Berry found that immigrants pursuing the assimilation strategy experienced intermediate levels of acculturative stress. According to Berry (1990b), the fact that integration was the most widely preferred mode of acculturation in his studies suggests that pluralism may constitute the ideology that best reflects the orientation of many first-generation immigrants in North America, though such patterns may differ in countries whose integration policies are situated on the assimilation and ethnic end of the ideological continuum.

Recently it was claimed that the first dimension of the Berry (1980, 1990b) model, identification with the immigrant culture, measured attitudes whereas the second assessed a behavioural intention regarding the desirability of contacts with the host society (Sayegh & Lasry, 1993). Although these two dimensions are somewhat different, they both refer to different types of attitudes, the first dealing with the value of ingroup cultural identity and the second being concerned with the value of cross-cultural contact. Nevertheless it seems worthwhile to resolve the possible inconsistency by changing the nature of the questionnaire items used to monitor the second dimension of the model. As seen in Fig. 2b, the new version of the dimension can be formulated as follows: “Is it considered to be of value to adopt the culture of the host community?” This reformulation of the second dimension provides a better match with the type of attitudes monitored on the first dimension of the model. A modified immigrant acculturation scale (IASm), with new questionnaire items monitoring this dimension of the model, has been successfully adapted and tested with Haitian (francophone) and West Indian (anglophone) immigrants in Québec (Moise & Bourhis, 1996).

Another refinement of the Berry model proposed in Fig. 2b involves the marginalization orientation. In earlier research with acculturating Australian aboriginals, Berry (1970) did find a link between marginality, alienation, deviance, and psychosomatic stress. As applied to the case of acculturating immigrants, it is those individuals who reject both their heritage culture and that of the host society who are most likely to experience the cultural alienation known as anomie. Thus, in line with the Berry (1990b) model, it is immigrants with the marginalization orientation who are most likely to experience problematic identification with both the group of origin and with the host majority. Along with problematic ethnocultural identification and acculturative stress, anomie can also adversely affect self-esteem and may hinder the adaptation of immigrants within the host society.

In contrast, some immigrants who dissociate themselves from both their ethnocultural origin and the host majority culture may do so not because they feel marginalized but simply because they prefer to identify themselves as individuals rather than as members of either an immigrant group or the host majority. Such “individualists” reject group ascriptions per se and prefer to treat others as individual persons rather than as members of group categories. Such immigrants may be more likely to originate from cultures whose values are individualist rather than collectivist (Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1988). Whereas in collectivist cultures individuals tend to subordinate their personal goals to those of the ascribed ingroups even if the latter are costly to the individual, such
is not the case in cultures whose values are more individualist. In individualist cultures loyalty to an ascribed ingroup is not so important and individuals are more likely to join or drop voluntary groups depending on their personal needs and the scale of demands imposed by their membership in the group. According to Triandis et al. (1988), examples of collectivist cultures are China, Japan, and southern Italy, whereas northern and western European countries, as well as the USA and Canada, are examples of more individualist cultures. Recent studies conducted with Québec first-generation immigrants did identify “rugged individualists” who refused to rely on either immigrant or host majority support to achieve their personal goals in the host country, believed strongly in the North American meritocracy system, and had a more positive self-esteem than immigrants whose acculturation orientations were assimilator or integrationist (Moghaddam, 1992). Clearly “individualist” should be included in the reformulation of the acculturation model presented in Fig. 2b, given that such immigrants refuse to be bounded by either ingroup or host majority ascriptions. The modified immigrant acculturation scale (IASm) includes items designed to differentiate immigrants whose acculturation orientation is anomic vs. individualist (Moïse & Bourhis, 1996).

A common shortcoming of most bidimensional models is the lack of importance given to how the host community can shape the acculturation orientations of immigrant groups. However, it is noteworthy that Berry (1974) did elaborate on the role played by the state and the host majority in shaping the orientation of acculturating groups. In line with this earlier work and as proposed in the framework presented in Fig. 1, it is clear that as the embodiment of dominant host society orientations, state-imposed integration policies play an important role in shaping the acculturation orientations of immigrant group members.

Using their multiculturalism ideology scale, Berry, Kalin, and Taylor (1977) have shown that members of the anglophone majority in Anglo-Canada are more supportive of multiculturalism as a state integration policy than are francophone majority respondents in Québec. Conversely, there is some evidence that immigrant attitudes and behaviours related to integration do differ in Québec relative to Anglo-Canada (Berry & Kalin, 1995; Bourhis, 1994; Kalin & Berry, 1994). Thus it is reasonable to assume that the acculturation strategies of immigrants are influenced by the acculturation orientations of host majority members from contrasting ethnolinguistic backgrounds. From an intergroup perspective (Bourhis & Leyens, 1994), a number of recent analyses have stressed the need to improve articulation of the interplay between host community and immigrant group acculturation orientations (Berry, 1990a, 1990b; Mayadas & Elliott, 1992; Woldemichael, 1987). For instance, Moghaddam and Taylor (1987) suggested that acculturation orientations such as maintenance of the immigrant culture can be mediated by the extent to which immigrants feel accepted or discriminated against by members of the host community (Bourhis & Gagnon, 1994; Moghaddam, 1992). Empirical studies in Canada (Lalonde & Cameron, 1993) and the USA (Oetting & Beauvais, 1991) have begun to address such issues. Furthermore, in their review of acculturation models, Sayehg and Lasry (1993, p. 107) concluded that “obstacles to the social integration of immigrants, within the host society, need to be examined in the interaction between members of both the ethnic communities and the host society.” Moreover, they also suggested that “acculturation occurs within the two groups, immigrants and host, with changes in each interacting together to influence the direction and outcome of that change.”

THE INTERACTIVE ACCULTURATION MODEL (IAM)

The Interactive Acculturation Model (IAM) seeks to integrate within a common theoretical framework the following components of immigrants and host community relations in multicultural settings: (1) acculturation orientations adopted by immigrant groups in the host community; (2) acculturation orientations adopted by the host community towards specific groups of immigrants; (3) interpersonal and intergroup relational outcomes that are the product of combinations of immigrant and host community acculturation orientations. Ultimately, the goal of the model is to present a nondeterminist, more dynamic account of immigrant and host community acculturation in multicultural settings (Bourhuis et al., 1996).

The first element of the model consists of the immigrant acculturation orientations presented in Fig. 2b. Immigrants can adopt one of the five acculturation orientations depending on their desire to maintain their heritage culture and their wish to adopt the culture of the host society. Using our variant of the Berry immigrant accul-
turation scale (IASm), immigrant acculturation can be measured as an individual difference orientation or it can be assessed at the group level as an orientation preferred by the majority of members within a particular immigrant group.

The second element of the model consists of the acculturation orientations preferred by members of the host society. As in the case for immigrant acculturation orientations, two dimensions can be used to situate the acculturation orientation of host community members. These two dimensions are: (1) Do you find it acceptable that immigrants maintain their cultural heritage? (2) Do you accept that immigrants adopt the culture of your host community? The acculturation orientation of host majority members is monitored using a new host community acculturation scale (HCAS). The HCAS is composed of questionnaire items scored on seven-point Likert scales, dealing with salient immigrant/host domains such as cultural maintenance, endogamy-exogamy, employment, and rental housing.

As seen in Fig. 3, responses to the HCAS questionnaire allow a four-way classification of host community members as regards their acculturation orientation towards immigrants: integration, assimilation, segregation, and exclusion. The individualism orientation toward immigrants is also a realistic option for host community members.

If positive responses are obtained for both dimensions, the integration orientation is preferred. Host community members accept and value the maintenance of the heritage culture of immigrants and also accept that immigrants adopt important features of the majority host culture. This orientation implies that host community members value a stable biculturalism amongst immigrant groups that may, in the long term, contribute to cultural pluralism as an enduring feature of the host society. The assimilation orientation corresponds to the traditional concepts of absorption, whereby host community members expect immigrants to relinquish their cultural identity for the sake of adopting the culture of the majority host society. The assimilation orientation implies that host community members will eventually consider those immigrants who have assimilated as full-fledged members of the host society. Members of the host community who prefer a segregation orientation distance themselves from immigrants by not wishing them to adopt or transform the host culture, though they accept that immigrants maintain their heritage culture. Host community members who adopt this segregation orientation do not favour cross-cultural contacts with immigrants, prefer them to remain together in separate community enclaves, and are ambivalent regarding the status of immigrants as rightful members of the host society.

Negative responses obtained on both dimensions reveal two basic acculturation orientations vis-à-vis immigrants. The first corresponds to the

| Dimension 1: Do you find it acceptable that immigrants maintain their cultural identity? |
|-----------------|-----------------|
| YES INTEGRATION | ASSIMILATION    |
| YES EXCLUSION   | INDIVIDUALISM   |
| NO SEGREGATION  |                 |

FIG. 3 Bidimensional model of host community acculturation orientations.
exclusion orientation, in which members of the host community are not only intolerant of the maintenance of the immigrant culture but also refuse to allow immigrants to adopt features of the host culture. Exclusionists deny immigrants the freedom to maintain their heritage culture and believe that immigrants can never be incorporated culturally or socially as rightful members of the host society. As regards attitudes concerning immigration, exclusionists would like immigration to stop and in some cases would prefer some categories of immigrants to be deported to their country of origin. Ethnocentric individuals and right-wing authoritarians are likely to favour an exclusionist orientation as regards immigration and integration issues (Altemeyer, 1988; Peralva, 1994).

Individualism is an orientation in which host community members define themselves and others as individuals rather than as members of group categories such as immigrants or host community members. For individualists it is the personal characteristics of individuals that count most rather than belonging to one group or another. Such individualists will therefore tend to downgrade the importance of maintaining the immigrant culture or adopting the host culture as a criteria of successful acculturation. Given that it is personal characteristics that count most, individualists will tend to interact with immigrants in the same way they would with other individuals who happen to be members of the host community. At present, the host community acculturation scale (HCAS) distinguishing these five orientations is being tested empirically in the francophone and anglophone host communities of Québec (Bougie & Bourhis, 1996).

How do host community acculturation orientations relate to our proposed continuum of state integration ideologies? As proposed in Fig. 1, state integration policies are expected to influence the acculturation orientation of host majority members. Likewise our framework assumes that dominant host majority members are likely to influence the integration policies of the state. Tentatively, our simplest hypothesis is that a match should exist between the type of acculturation orientation preferred by host community members and their support for the corresponding state ideologies depicted on our continuum (Fig. 1). Thus, host community members whose acculturation orientation is integrationist are likely to favour a pluralism ideology as regards public policy for the integration of immigrants. Host community members whose acculturation orientation is assimilationist are quite likely to endorse public policies along the civic to assimilationist range of the ideological continuum. Host community members whose acculturation orientation is segregationist are likely to support policies that range from the assimilationist to the ethnist pole of the continuum. Exclusionist host community members are likely only to support state policies that reflect the ethnist ideology. Individualists are more likely to support policies that range on the pluralism to civic part of the continuum than those on the assimilationist to ethnist pole of the continuum.

Figure 4 shows how host community and immigrant acculturation orientations can be combined within a single conceptual framework. The five immigrant orientations are presented on the horizontal axis while the five host community orientations are presented on the vertical axis. The first premise of the model is that different configurations of host community and immigrant group orientations must be determined for each immigrant group depending on their ethnocultural and national origin. Host community acculturation orientations are not uniform; they may vary depending on the ethnocultural origin of each immigrant group being assessed. For instance, results obtained using the host community acculturation scale (HCAS) may yield contrasting patterns for immigrant group A vs. group B. The percentage of host community members who adopt each orientation towards immigrant group A may be: 60% adopt integration; 25% assimilation; 8% segregation; 2% exclusion; and 5% individualist. However, towards stigmatized immigrant group B the same sample of host community respondents may adopt the following orientations: 10% adopt integration; 15% assimilation; 50% segregation; 20% exclusion; and 5% individualist. Such results could be obtained using the HCAS with a representative sample of majority members of the host society. For finer analysis of the acculturation orientation of subgroups of the host society, results of the HCAS could be correlated with social class, age, sex, regional origin, degree of identification as a member of the host majority, and degree of contact with immigrant group members in everyday life (Bougie & Bourhis, 1996). Furthermore, the proportion of host community members adopting each of the acculturation orientations may vary across time for the same target immigrant group depending on changing demographic, economic, and political circumstances. For instance, host community
orientations towards a particular immigrant group may be mostly integrationist at first and then shift towards the exclusionist pole as the arrival of more members of the immigrant group in the host society is portrayed negatively by certain political parties or the mass media.

Likewise, different immigrant groups are expected to adopt different configurations of acculturation orientations depending on their ethnocultural origin, social class background, age, sex, degree of ingroup identification, degree of contact with the host majority, and state integration policies towards them. The proportion of immigrants from the same ethnic origin favouring each acculturation orientation as measured using the IASm scale may also change from the first to the second generation and may depend on the pattern of upward or downward mobility experienced in the country of adoption during the life-span and across the generations.

Another premise of the model is that although the host majority usually enjoys a strong vitality position, immigrant groups usually have low to medium vitality within the country of adoption. Group vitality is a conceptual framework that can be used to compare the relative strength and weaknesses of immigrant and host community groups in multicultural settings (Giles, Bourhis, & Taylor, 1977). The group vitality of an immigrant group is that which makes the group likely to act as a distinctive and collective entity within the host society. Demographic variables are those related to the sheer number of individuals composing the immigrant group and their distribution throughout a particular urban or regional territory. Institutional control factors refer to the extent to which an immigrant group has gained representation at decision-making levels of the host society in education, business, mass media, culture, and in the government. The status variables are those related to an immigrant group social prestige, its sociohistorical status, and the prestige of its language and culture locally and internationally. Combined, these three factors contribute to the strength and vitality of immigrant groups relative to the host society (Harwood, Giles, & Bourhis, 1994). Thus, by virtue of their advantaged demographic, status, and institutional control position it is expected that host majority acculturation orientations will have a stronger impact on immigrant acculturation orientations than the converse. Thus, immigrant groups who have low vitality will be more vulnerable to the impact of dominant host majority orientations such as segregation and
exclusion than would medium vitality immigrant groups. Conversely, the stronger the vitality of specific immigrant groups the more likely such groups are to adopt orientations that reflect their own priorities rather than those determined by the host majority. The acculturation orientations of immigrant groups may also change in line with improvements or declines in immigrant group vitality across time. For instance, as the vitality of an immigrant group improves thanks to sustained immigration and stronger institutional control gained within the host country, the profile of acculturation orientations may shift from a mainly assimilation to a predominantly integration orientation.

As can be seen in Fig. 4, it is by combining the five orientations of immigrant groups with the five host community ones that the interactive nature of the IAM framework becomes most evident. Of interest is the degree to which the profile of orientations of the host community and that of the immigrant group matches or mismatches each other based on results obtained using the IASm and the HCAS questionnaires with representative samples of these respective groups. Concordance emerges when the host community and the immigrant group in question share virtually the same profile of acculturation orientations. For instance, questionnaire results may show that the majority of both the host community (HCAS scale) and immigrant group members (IASm scale) prefer the integration orientation. Discordance between the host community and the immigrant group will prevail when the profile of acculturation orientations obtained for the two communities match very little or not at all. An example of discordance is when the majority of immigrant group members want to integrate while the host community adopts a segregation orientation towards the immigrant group in question.

Concordant and discordant acculturation profiles yield different relational outcomes for individual immigrants and host community group members. Relational outcomes at the social psychological level include patterns of intercultural communications between immigrants and host community members, interethnic attitudes and stereotypes, acculturative stress, and discrimination between immigrant and host majority members in domains such as housing, employment, schooling, the police, and the judiciary (Bourhis & Gagnon, 1994). As can be seen in Fig. 4, it is the interaction of immigrant and host community acculturation orientations along with their concordant or discordant profile that determine whether relational outcomes are consensual, problematic, or conflictual in different domains. As seen in Fig. 1, these three clusters of relational outcomes can be situated on a single continuum ranging from consensual at one pole, problematic at the midpoint, and conflictual at the opposite pole. Thus the three clusters of relational outcomes should not be seen as discrete mutually exclusive categories.

As seen in Fig. 4, the most consensual relational outcomes are predicted in three cells of the model, namely when both host community members and immigrant group members share either the integration, assimilation, or individualism acculturation orientations. It is under such circumstances that the model predicts positive relational outcomes in most domains of host community and immigrant group relations. At the Social Psychological level, these could include positive and effective verbal and nonverbal cross-cultural communications; mutually positive interethnic attitudes and stereotypes, low intergroup tension, low acculturative stress, and virtually no discrimination between host and immigrant group members. Thus ideal immigrant and host community relational outcomes are predicted in these three cells of the model.

Discordance in acculturation orientations between the host majority and the immigrant group yields the next two clusters of relational outcomes on the continuum; problematic or conflictual. Problematic relational outcomes emerge when the host community and the immigrant group experience both partial agreement and partial disagreement as regards their profile of acculturation orientations. The model predicts that problematic relational outcomes are most likely to emerge in 10 cells of the table presented in Fig. 4. Two common problematic outcomes emerge when immigrant group members favour assimilation while host community members prefer immigrants to adopt the integration orientation and, conversely, when immigrant group members prefer integration but host community members insist that immigrants assimilate to the host society. These two types of relational outcomes can trigger communication breakdown between speakers of the two communities, foster negative intergroup stereotypes, lead to discriminatory behaviours, and cause moderate levels of acculturative stress, especially amongst members of the immigrant group. Problematic relational outcomes are also likely to emerge for immigrant
group members whose acculturation orientation is anomic (marginalisation) or individualist in a host society that favours integration or assimilation. Likewise, host community persons who favour an individualistic orientation are likely to have problematic relational outcomes with immigrants who stress their ethnocultural group membership whether their acculturation orientation is integrationist, assimilationist, separatist, or anomic.

Confictual relational outcomes are most likely to emerge in 12 cells of the model presented in Fig. 4. Immigrant group members who endorse the separation strategy are likely to experience tense relational outcomes with most host community members, especially those who have a segregationist or exclusionist orientation. Host majority members who endorse the segregation and exclusion orientation towards immigrants are likely to foster the most conflicctual relational outcomes with targeted immigrant groups. Exclusionists are likely to have even more negative relational outcomes with immigrants than segmentationists. In addition to miscommunicating with immigrants, exclusionists and segmentationists are likely to have very negative stereotypes concerning immigrants and to discriminate against them in many domains including employment and housing. Furthermore, exclusionists are the members of the host community most likely to launch racist attacks against immigrants and to organize politically to denigrate and expel immigrants. Under such circumstances, immigrant groups that have very low vitality are likely to be more vulnerable and suffer more acculturative stress than medium vitality immigrant groups, whose strength in numbers and institutional support can better shield them against abuses from exclusionist host members. Of the immigrants that are targeted by exclusionists it is separatist immigrants who are most likely to resist and even retaliate against host community persecutions. Thus the model predicts the most intergroup conflict in encounters between exclusionist host community members and immigrants who have a separatist orientation.

As implied in Fig. 1, we can propose that confictual relational outcomes may be attenuated by state integration policies that are situated at the pluralistic and civic pole of the continuum. Conversely, confictual relational outcomes may be accentuated by state policies that are situated at the assimilation and especially the ethnist pole of the continuum. Thus, state integration policies may attenuate or accentuate the patterns of relational outcomes depicted in Fig. 4.

CONCLUDING NOTES

Overall, the IAM model proposes that state integration policies can have a strong “carry-over” effect on both immigrant and host community acculturation orientations. Generally, it can be hypothesized that integration policies reflecting the pluralism and civic ideologies are more likely to yield positive and harmonious relational outcomes than policies reflecting the assimilation ideology. In contrast, segregationist and exclusionist policies reflecting the ethnist ideology are likely to foster confictual relational outcomes between the host majority and immigrant minorities. However, the model predicts that even when state policies reflect a pluralist or civic ideology, a proportion of the host community population is likely to maintain segregationist or exclusionist orientations towards specific immigrant groups. Likewise, the model predicts that a certain proportion of the immigrant population will be separatist or experience anomic even when state policies reflect the pluralism or civic ideology. The model also predicts that in some cases immigrant acculturation orientations may directly influence the acculturation orientation of the host majority. A medium vitality immigrant group that systematically adopts a separation orientation may shift host majority attitudes from the integration to the segregation or exclusionist pole of the acculturation continuum.

The IAM model proposes a conceptual bridge between public policy, host majority, and immigrant group reactions to ethnocultural diversity. The model makes predictions regarding the acculturation combinations most likely to produce consensual, problematic, and confictual relational outcomes between immigrants and members of the host community. Thus it is a combination of state integration policies and host majority and immigrant group acculturation orientations that contribute to the relational outcomes proposed in the model. Taken together these propositions demonstrate the dynamic nature of the IAM framework, whose ultimate goal is to better account for host community and immigrant group relations as they evolve in ever-changing multicultural and multiethic settings. Though empirical studies are under way, a great deal of fundamental and applied research is still needed to test the basic premises of the IAM model.

Manuscript first received October 1996
Revised manuscript accepted March 1997
REFERENCES


BOURHISETAL.

Québec: Institut québécois pour la recherche sur la culture.


